Hybrid Warfare Insight

Information Warfare and Influence

This pathway follows information warfare through FIMI reporting, cognitive and narrative frameworks, public resilience, platform manipulation and historically rooted influence practices.

Links last checked: July 31, 2026.

The notes explain why each resource is useful and where its limits are. Inclusion does not mean Hybrid Warfare Insight endorses every conclusion. Some resources are available only in French or only in English.

Related on HWI: Understanding hybrid warfare; cognitive biases; semi-active networks; glossary.

Documentary blocks

4th Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats

Source type: institutional report. Author/institution: EEAS. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2026.

The EU’s annual FIMI report documents observed manipulation and interference threats through a shared reporting vocabulary.

Why it matters: It helps connect cases to repeatable behaviours, actor patterns and public resilience measures.

Limit: It reflects EU visibility and priorities; it does not capture the entire global information environment.

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NATO’s Approach to Counter Information Threats

Source type: institutional source. Author/institution: NATO. Language: English-language resource. Date: public topic page.

This NATO page clarifies how the Alliance frames information threats and related resilience.

Why it matters: It is useful for comparing FIMI, disinformation, counter-information-threat and cognitive-security vocabularies.

Limit: It is institutional doctrine-facing communication, not independent research.

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Défis et « opportunités » de l’intelligence artificielle dans la lutte contre les manipulations de l’information

Source type: institutional report. Author/institution: VIGINUM / SGDSN. Language: French-language resource. Date: 2025.

This report focuses on how artificial intelligence affects the production, detection and response to information manipulation.

Why it matters: It connects generative systems to influence, but keeps the issue inside the information-manipulation field.

Limit: It should not be read as a general cyberattack manual or a full account of AI security.

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Note sur le concept de « mode opératoire informationnel »

Source type: institutional note. Author/institution: VIGINUM / SGDSN. Language: French-language resource. Date: 2026.

The note defines a French analytical unit for describing recurring information manipulation patterns.

Why it matters: It helps distinguish isolated content from patterns of behaviour and coordination.

Limit: It is a French institutional concept, not a universal standard.

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Stratégie nationale de lutte contre les manipulations de l’information 2026-2030

Source type: national strategy. Author/institution: SGDSN. Language: French-language resource. Date: 2026.

France’s national strategy sets out public priorities, institutional roles and resilience goals for countering information manipulation.

Why it matters: It gives readers a policy anchor for French terminology and institutional architecture.

Limit: A strategy states intent; it does not prove implementation or effectiveness.

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Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity

Source type: institutional report. Author/institution: OECD. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2024.

The OECD frames disinformation as a governance and information-integrity problem affecting democratic systems.

Why it matters: It broadens the pathway from hostile campaigns to the institutional conditions that make societies resilient or vulnerable.

Limit: It is less useful for tactical attribution than for policy design and governance comparison.

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Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making

Source type: research report. Authors: Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan. Host: Council of Europe. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2017.

A foundational framework distinguishing misinformation, disinformation and malinformation.

Why it matters: It remains useful for avoiding a single catch-all use of “fake news.”

Limit: It predates many platform and AI developments that now shape manipulation and amplification.

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The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model

Source type: research perspective. Authors: Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews. Institution: RAND. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2016.

A compact description of propaganda that is high-volume, multichannel, rapid, repetitive and not committed to consistency.

Why it matters: It explains why saturation and speed can matter as much as persuasion.

Limit: The model is specific and should not be used as a label for every noisy influence campaign.

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La Guerre de l’information

Source type: expert book. Author: David Colon. Publisher: Tallandier. Language: French-language resource. Date: 2023; paperback 2025.

A broad historical and contemporary survey of state propaganda, disinformation and influence strategies.

Why it matters: It gives French-speaking readers a durable narrative bridge between history and current information warfare.

Limit: It is broad and state-centered; it should not be treated as a universal taxonomy.

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Les guerres de l’information à l’ère numérique

Source type: edited academic volume. Editors: Céline Marangé and Maud Quessard. Publisher: PUF. Language: French-language resource. Date: 2021.

A collective volume comparing actors, doctrines and digital transformations in information warfare.

Why it matters: It is useful for moving beyond a single-country or single-platform view of influence.

Limit: As an edited volume, its chapters vary in scope and some cases age faster than the historical frame.

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Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media

Source type: academic book. Editors: Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2018.

A comparative academic base for automated and organized political manipulation on social media.

Why it matters: It links platform dynamics to organized influence instead of treating disinformation only as content.

Limit: The platform data predates newer moderation regimes, short-video ecosystems and generative AI.

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Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order

Source type: academic book. Authors: Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle. Publisher: Routledge. Language: English-language resource. Date: 2013.

A central framework for understanding system, identity and issue narratives in international politics.

Why it matters: It helps analyze influence as a struggle over meaning rather than only over facts.

Limit: It is a theory of strategic communication, not a method for attributing an operation.

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