The Resources section is a bilingual documentary hub for exploring hybrid warfare, gray-zone competition, information manipulation and the human networks that give conflicts depth.
Links last checked: July 31, 2026.
Resource notes explain usefulness and limits. Inclusion does not mean Hybrid Warfare Insight endorses every conclusion, and some resources are available only in French or only in English.
Related on HWI: Understanding hybrid warfare; cognitive biases; primitive hybrid warfare; semi-active networks; glossary.
Thematic pathways
Hybrid warfare and the gray zone
Foundational frameworks, gray-zone debates and critical perspectives on the continuum of conflict.
10 resources
Information warfare and influence
FIMI, narratives, cognitive effects, public integrity and platform manipulation.
12 resources
Human networks and irregular conflict
Academic work on cohesion, fragmentation, local information and organizational depth.
9 resources
Lectures, videos and hearings
Talks, interviews and the French National Assembly hearing cycle as a documentary dossier.
10 resources
Start here
NATO — Countering hybrid threats
Institutional source; NATO; English-language resource; current public topic page.
A concise institutional entry point to hybrid threats as combinations of military and non-military, covert and overt means.
Limit: Useful for NATO framing, but not a neutral global definition of the whole field.
The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A Conceptual Model
Institutional framework; European Commission and Hybrid CoE; English-language resource; 2020.
A structured model for mapping domains, actors, phases and vulnerabilities in hybrid-threat analysis.
Limit: A policy framework, not a proof that every pressure campaign follows the same sequence.
4th Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats
Institutional report; EEAS; English-language resource; 2026.
The EU’s annual FIMI report helps track recurring tactics, actor behaviour and reporting vocabulary.
Limit: It reflects the EU’s detection and policy lens; it is not a full history of all influence operations.
NATO’s Approach to Counter Information Threats
Institutional source; NATO; English-language resource; public topic page.
A useful view of how NATO names hostile information activity, resilience and counter-information-threat work.
Limit: Alliance terminology should be compared with EU, national and academic vocabularies.
Défis et « opportunités » de l’intelligence artificielle dans la lutte contre les manipulations de l’information
Institutional report; VIGINUM / SGDSN; French-language resource; 2025.
A French public report on how AI changes production, detection and response in information manipulation.
Limit: It is focused on information manipulation, not on the full cyber or military spectrum.
Note sur le concept de « mode opératoire informationnel »
Institutional note; VIGINUM / SGDSN; French-language resource; 2026.
A compact note that clarifies the French concept of an information modus operandi.
Limit: A national analytical vocabulary; it should not be presented as an international standard.
Stratégie nationale de lutte contre les manipulations de l’information 2026-2030
National strategy; SGDSN; French-language resource; 2026.
A policy document for understanding France’s public approach to countering information manipulation.
Limit: It is a national strategy, not an independent evaluation of effectiveness.
NATO Allied Command Transformation — Cognitive Warfare
Institutional source; NATO ACT; English-language resource; public activity page.
A useful institutional window into cognitive warfare as a concern for military transformation and resilience.
Limit: The concept is debated; the page should be read as one institutional framing among others.
Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity
Institutional report; OECD; English-language resource; 2024.
A governance-oriented report on information integrity, democratic resilience and public policy responses.
Limit: It is stronger on policy ecosystems than on tactical attribution of operations.
Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making
Research report; Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan for the Council of Europe; English-language resource; 2017.
A foundational distinction between misinformation, disinformation and malinformation.
Limit: The typology is influential, but platform practices and generative AI have evolved since publication.
The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model
Research perspective; Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, RAND; English-language resource; 2016.
A concise model of high-volume, rapid, repetitive and indifferent-to-truth propaganda.
Limit: It describes a specific Russian propaganda model; it should not become a generic label for every noisy campaign.